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Recent authors have drawn attention to a kind of defeating evidence
commonly referred to as higher-order evidence. Such evidence works by
inducing doubts that one’s doxastic state is the result of a ﬂawed process
—for instance, a process brought about by a reason-distorting drug. I argue
that accommodating defeat by higher-order evidence requires a two-tiered
theory of justiﬁcation, and that the phenomenon gives rise to a puzzle.
The puzzle is that at least in some situations involving higher-order defeat-
ers the correct epistemic rules issue conﬂicting recommendations. For
instance, a subject ought to believe p, but she ought also to suspend judg-
ment in p. I discuss three responses. The ﬁrst resists the puzzle by arguing
that there is only one correct epistemic rule, an €Uber-rule. The second
accepts that there are genuine epistemic dilemmas. The third appeals to a
hierarchy or ordering of correct epistemic rules. I spell out problems for
all of these responses. I conclude that the right lesson to draw from the
puzzle is that a state can be epistemically rational or justiﬁed even if one
has what looks to be strong evidence to think that it is not. As such, the
considerations put forth constitute a non-question-begging argument for a
kind of externalism.
I. The Defeatist Trend in Epistemology
There has been an ever-accelerating trend in post-Cartesian epistemology to
acknowledge the defeasibility of justiﬁcation and knowledge. The scope of
beliefs regarded as defeasible has broadened because of the recognition of
new kinds of evidence with putative defeating force. The newest addition to
this category is a variety of evidence that has been dubbed “higher-order”
314 MARIA LASONEN-AARNIO
Philosophy and
Phenomenological Research
or “second-order” evidence.1 In one way or another, such evidence works
by inducing doubts that one’s doxastic state is the result of a ﬂawed
process. In what follows I will argue that attempts to take defeat by higher-
order evidence seriously face a puzzle. I sketch three responses to the
puzzle, and argue that there is no altogether happy resolution.2 But let me
begin by saying a bit more about the putative phenomenon of defeat by
higher-order evidence.
Evidence that one’s doxastic state is the result of a ﬂawed process can
take many forms. It may be evidence that one is subject to a deep but
undetectable cognitive malfunction; that one has made a simple calculation
error; that one has failed to appreciate the import of one’s evidence; or
even that the epistemic rules one follows are incorrect. Here are some
examples involving the kind of higher-order evidence that is widely
thought to have defeating force:
Mental maths
My friend and I have often amused ourselves by solving little math prob-
lems in our heads, and comparing our answers. We have strikingly similar
track records: we are both very reliable at doing mental maths, and neither
is more reliable than the other. We now engage in this pastime, and I
come up with an answer to a problem, 457. I then learn that my friend
came up with a different answer, 459.3
Hypoxia
I have just achieved a difﬁcult ﬁrst ascent in the Himalayas. As the
weather turns, I have to abseil down a long pitch. I have gone through a
sequence of reasoning several times to check that I have constructed my
anchor correctly, that I haven’t under-estimated the length of the pitch, and
that I have threaded the rope correctly through my belay device and cara-
biner. I then acquire evidence that I am in serious danger of being affected
by a mild case of hypoxia caused by high altitude. Such hypoxia impairs
one’s reasoning while making it seem perfectly ﬁne. I know that mountain-
eers have made stupid but fatal mistakes in the past as a result of being in
such a condition.4
In both cases I acquire evidence that I am subject to a cognitive malfunc-
tion of some sort and hence, that my doxastic state is the output of a ﬂawed
1 See, for instance, Christensen (2007a, 2007b, 2007c, 2009, 2010a), Elga (unpublished),
Feldman (2005), Kelly (2010), Schechter (2011).
2 I see no signiﬁcant difference between intuitions elicited by more familiar cases of defeat
and those elicited by cases involving higher-order evidence. This is why I take the kinds
of problems sketched below to cast doubt on a defeatist way of thinking more generally.
3 The case closely resembles cases often used to motivate conciliatory views of disagree-
ment. See, for instance, Christensen (2010a: 186-187).
4 Cf. Christensen (2010b), Elga (unpublished) and Schechter (2011).
HIGHER-ORDER EVIDENCE AND THE LIMITS OF DEFEAT 315
cognitive process.5 Though this is not uncontroversial, I will assume that the
kind of ﬂaw we are interested in is one that would prevent a belief from being
epistemically rational or justiﬁed in the ﬁrst place: if I make a simple calculation
error or reason badly due to hypoxia, my belief may be excusable, but it is not
justiﬁed. Hence, the kind of rational self-doubt induced by higher-order defeat-
ers is doubt about one’s own epistemic rationality. By contrast, evidence that a
belief is false, for instance, need not be evidence that it is ﬂawed in this sense.6
Among current epistemologists the majority view appears to be that
evidence producing sufﬁciently strong rational doubt about the epistemic
integrity of a doxastic state calls for revising that state, even if it is the result
of an impeccable process.7 These epistemologists endorse a principle along
the following lines:
Higher-order defeat
Evidence that a cognitive process producing a doxastic state S as output is
ﬂawed has defeating force with respect to S.8
5 What I will mean by “acquiring evidence that I am subject to a cognitive malfunction” or
“acquiring evidence that my doxastic state is the output of a ﬂawed cognitive process” is
acquiring evidence that now makes it sufﬁciently likely—likely above some threshold—that
such an eventuality has occurred. The threshold need not be that required for outright belief.
For instance, if inMental maths I am equally conﬁdent that my friend has made a mistake as
that I have, but conﬁdent that not both of us are mistaken, then I am 50% conﬁdent that I am
subject to a cognitive malfunction. Presumably, this doesn’t justify outright belief.
6 What about evidence that a belief isn’t reliably formed? On the present approach
whether or not such evidence always has higher-order defeating force depends on
whether reliability is a necessary condition on justiﬁcation. See also footnote 8.
7 But there are exceptions—see, for instance, Field (2000).
8 The principle is similar in spirit to a principle Christensen calls Integration:
Integration
An agent’s object-level beliefs must reﬂect the agent’s meta-level beliefs about the
reliability of the cognitive processes underlying her object-level beliefs (Christensen
2007b).
The reason why I prefer not to speak of evidence about the reliability of one’s cognitive
processes is that I doubt whether having such evidence is sufﬁcient or necessary for the
kind of phenomenon that people tend to classify as defeat by higher-order evidence.
Imagine that I acquire evidence that I am a brain in a vat. Wouldn’t this be evidence that
processes underlying my object-level beliefs about my environment fail to be reliable?
However, it is unclear whether such defeaters should be classiﬁed as higher-order, for it is
at least controversial whether I acquire evidence that my states are ﬂawed in a way that
prevented them from ever being epistemically rational or justiﬁed. After all, many think
that it is rational for a brain in a vat who is unaware of her predicament to take perceptual
experiences at face value. Also, if a reliabilist account of justiﬁcation is rejected, it should
be possible to acquire evidence that a cognitive process fails to produce a rational belief
without acquiring evidence bearing on the reliability of the process.
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Coarse-grained states such as believing a proposition p or suspending
judgment in p count as doxastic states, but so do more ﬁne-grained states
such as assigning a credence of 0.8 to p. So, for instance, my 0.8 conﬁ-
dence in rain tomorrow may no longer be justiﬁed or rational if I acquire
evidence that I have misevaluated the meteorological data. Higher-order
defeat yields a simple recipe for generating a defeater for just about any
belief: just imagine sufﬁciently strong evidence that the cognitive process
producing that belief is ﬂawed. I will simply take on board the view that in
cases of the sort described above the subject does, indeed, acquire evidence
that some of her cognitive processes are ﬂawed. The question will be
whether such evidence has defeating force with respect to the states that are
outputs of those processes.
What has been said suggests an account of how higher-order defeat dif-
fers from more ordinary or traditional kinds of defeat. Consider a case in
which I come to believe some proposition p, but my belief is defeated by
subsequently acquired evidence for not-p. Such rebutting evidence need not
be evidence that my original belief in p was ﬂawed in a way that prevented
it from ever being justiﬁed. Indeed, can’t I recognise that my original belief
was perfectly justiﬁed given the evidence I had? The same applies to stan-
dard examples of undercutting defeat. Assume that I am told that what
I believe based on perception to be a red object is in fact being illuminated
by red trick lighting. Such evidence doesn’t seem to cast any doubt on the
epistemic rationality of my originally believing the object to be red based
on my perceptual experience as of a red object. By contrast, defeat by
higher-order evidence has a retrospective aspect, providing a subject with
evidence that her belief was never rational, reasonable, or justiﬁed to start
out with.9 It’s not just that now, once I get evidence that I may be suffering
from hypoxia, I am no longer justiﬁed in believing what I did. I acquire evi-
dence that I was never justiﬁed to start out with. I will assume that whether
or not it sufﬁces to distinguish ordinary from higher-order defeaters, higher-
order defeat has the kind of retrospective aspect described.
Now, someone might grant that there is a difference between higher-
order defeaters and more ordinary kinds of defeaters, but wonder whether
there is really anything that puzzling about defeat by higher-order evidence.
Consider the following line of thought:
“Epistemic rationality is a matter of proportioning one’s doxastic states to
the evidence. For instance, one ought to believe p just in case one’s
evidence sufﬁciently supports p. But when a subject has higher-order
9 This is all compatible with a piece of evidence having both higher-order and ﬁrst-order
defeating force. Perhaps, for instance, higher-order defeaters often or even always have
some rebutting force: evidence that I came to believe p as a result of a ﬂawed process
may be weak evidence that p is false.
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evidence that a doxastic state she is in is ﬂawed, retaining that state
doesn’t count as proportioning her beliefs to her overall evidence. Higher-
order evidence is just more evidence. There is nothing puzzling about it.”
The suggestion is that higher-order evidence that one’s belief in p is ﬂawed
affects the degree of support that one’s total evidence lends to p, for such
evidence is ipso facto evidence against p. I am very sympathetic to the
thought that higher-order evidence should be treated as just more evidence.
However, whether or not this will yield anything like the systematic sort of
defeat that a lot of epistemologists are after—that is, a view respecting a
principle along the lines of Higher-order defeat—is far from clear.
First, one might wonder whether higher-order evidence has the desired
effect on degrees of support. In effect, David Christensen argues that it is
peculiar to such evidence that conditionalising on it leaves the degree to
which one’s evidence supports the relevant proposition p intact.10 Whether or
not this is right, I think the above line of thought runs into problems not deriv-
ing from any speciﬁc norms for belief-revision or credal dynamics. Assume
for the sake of argument that conditionalising on higher-order evidence had
the desired effect on one’s credences, and that conditionalisation was in fact
the correct way of taking new evidence into account. Now consider evidence
that one has been given a drug that makes everything seem perfectly normal,
though one is in fact highly likely to make mistakes in attempting to condi-
tionalise on evidence. If new evidence ought to be taken into account by con-
ditionalisation, one ought to conditionalise on this (and subsequent) evidence.
But Higher-order defeat would suggest that the resulting doxastic states are
defeated, for one would have evidence that they don’t result from conditional-
ising on one’s evidence. And so it looks like there is evidence that cannot be
rationally taken into account by conditionalisation after all.
This points to the kind of puzzle created by attempting to take systematic
defeat by higher-order evidence seriously. In what follows I want to spell
out the puzzle in more detail, and to discuss different resolutions. Ulti-
mately, I think that each runs into problems that warrant re-evaluating prin-
ciples like Higher-order defeat. I will begin by arguing that endorsing
defeat by higher-order evidence creates pressure to adopt what I call a two-
tiered theory of justiﬁcation.
II. A Two-Tiered Theory of Justiﬁcation
A two-tiered theory of justiﬁcation is generated by the following thought. Con-
sider candidates for the kind of epistemic good F that confers justiﬁcation (or
epistemic rationality) on a doxastic state. F might, for instance, be the property
10 Christensen (2010a: 195).
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of having come about by an application of correct epistemic rules, or the prop-
erty of being the output of a reliable process. Now assume that it is possible for
a state to have F while one has evidence that it lacks F—or, more generally,
that it is possible for a state to have F while one has evidence that the state in
question is ﬂawed. Then, F cannot be a necessary and sufﬁcient condition for
justiﬁcation or epistemic rationality after all. An additional condition is needed
that rules out higher-order defeaters. A useful heuristic picture of what a two-
tiered theory of justiﬁcation will involve is the following: if one’s belief in a
proposition p is to be justiﬁed, it must have some property F, and in addition,
one must lack (sufﬁciently strong) evidence that it fails to have F.
In what follows, I will make an assumption about what the epistemic
good-making properties of doxastic states are. It has its roots in what I will
call a rule-driven picture of epistemic cognition. On such a picture, doxastic
responses at least typically involve the application of epistemic rules, and
whether or not a doxastic state is epistemically rational or justiﬁed depends
on the goodness of the rules that were applied in forming or maintaining
that state. I will call the good rules the correct ones, recognising that in the
two-tiered theory I sketch, correct rules play a somewhat different role than
they do in more traditional theories exemplifying the rule-driven picture.
The idea is roughly (subject to some qualiﬁcations below) that it is a neces-
sary condition on the rationality of a doxastic response that it involve the
application of a correct epistemic rule. Those who endorse the picture tend
to think that this is also a sufﬁcient condition. But for reasons that will
become clear, the phenomenon of higher-order defeat puts serious pressure
to reject any assumption of sufﬁciency.
The rule-driven picture will provide a neat framework for exploring what
is puzzling about higher-order evidence. Though not uncontroversial, it is
very widely accepted.11 In particular, the most well-developed and promis-
ing attempts to come to terms with more ordinary kinds of defeaters sub-
scribe to, or are at least compatible with, thinking about epistemic
rationality in terms of following correct rules or norms.12 The picture is able
to accommodate a very wide range of views. For instance, any view inter-
ested in a notion of well-founded belief, belief that is based in the right sort
of way on adequate and undefeated reasons or evidence, will presumably
need to invoke the idea of correct rules of inference in saying what it is to
base a belief on the right reasons in the right kind of way. Or, take a view
on which justiﬁed or epistemically rational degrees of belief obey the proba-
bility axioms and evolve by some form of conditionalisation. Presumably,
11 Cf. Boghossian (2008). Though Boghossian raises problems for the picture, he admits to
ﬁnding it “as natural and compelling as the next person” (473).
12 For instance, Pollock and Cruz (1999) write: “a belief is justiﬁed if and only if it is
licensed by correct epistemic norms”(123).
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proponents of such views think of a rule telling one to conditionalise on
new evidence as a correct epistemic rule.
I will assume that an epistemic rule can be represented by a function
from possible circumstances to recommendations about which doxastic
states one may or must adopt in those circumstances. But there is contro-
versy about exactly how we should think of rules in general, and epistemic
rules in particular. On one view, rules are imperatival contents along the
following lines:
In circumstances of type C, believe p!
On another, they are normative propositions along the following lines:
In circumstances of type C, one ought to/is permitted to believe p.
I won’t need to adjudicate between these.13 Even on the ﬁrst view, I take
correct epistemic rules to be associated with true statements about what one
ought to or may believe in various circumstances—indeed, I take this to
follow from the fact that they are normative. On some of the views to be
discussed these will emerge to be merely prima facie oughts. But this need
not worry us just yet.
Statements along the lines of “In circumstances of type C, one ought to
believe p” are ambiguous, for the “ought” in such statements can be assigned
either a scope over the whole conditional or just its consequent. I doubt that
much of what I say below rests on this choice. However, considering cases of
higher-order defeat may give us a reason to take them to be wide-scope. Take
a recommendation along the following lines: “If you believe p and acquire
such-and-such evidence that your belief is ﬂawed, then revise it in such-and-
such a way”. If we construe the normative proposition corresponding to this
statement as involving a narrow-scope ought, then it looks like the rule would
only ever apply to subjects who believe p while having evidence that their
beliefs are ﬂawed. But if champions of defeat by higher-order evidence are
right, it is epistemically irrational to believe p while having evidence that one’s
belief is ﬂawed. A rule that can only ever apply to subjects who are (at least for
some time) irrational seems problematic. The issues here are complex, and I
don’t want to rest too much on this observation. But it might provide a reason
to take the epistemic rules in question to correspond to wide-scope oughts.14
13 For a discussion—and problems for both views—see Boghossian (2008).
14 Perhaps imperatives are ambiguous in a way that mirrors the ambiguity in the corre-
sponding normative statements. Should it, however, turn out that imperatival contents
correspond to the narrow-scope propositions, this might provide a reason not to think of
epistemic rules as imperatival contents.
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With the rule-driven picture on the table, let me now return to the argu-
ment for a two-tiered theory of justiﬁcation, and the puzzle to which defeat
by higher-order evidence gives rise. Again, let F be a property capturing
the kind of epistemic goodness that a doxastic state must exemplify in order
for that state to be epistemically rational, reasonable, or justiﬁed. Taking the
rule-driven picture as a starting point, I will assume that F is roughly (sub-
ject to some qualiﬁcations below) the property of coming about by applica-
tions of correct epistemic rules, be these rules telling one to take one’s
sensory perceptions (or one’s memories, or the testimony of others) at face
value when there is no reason to distrust them, or rules like conditionalisa-
tion.
Such a picture may look congenial when it comes to ordinary kinds of
defeaters. Consider, for instance, the kinds of epistemic rules governing sen-
sory perception that epistemologists have proposed. A rule telling one to
believe p when it perceptually seems to one as if p, no matter what, doesn’t
look like a very good candidate for a correct rule. A rule telling one to
believe p when it perceptually seems to one as if p and there is no (sufﬁ-
ciently strong) reason to think that one’s perceptions are not to be trusted is
much better.15 Similarly, a view on which a subject ought to conditionalise
on new evidence seems able to make sense of at least many ordinary kinds
of defeaters: the probability of an object being red conditional on its look-
ing red is high, but the probability of being red conditional on looking red
and being illuminated by trick red lighting is not.16
Be the matter of ordinary defeaters as it may, when it comes to dealing
with higher-order defeaters, the property F would have to be one that
beliefs can only have in the absence of evidence that they are ﬂawed. In so
far as a state must have F in order to be justiﬁed or epistemically rational,
evidence that a state lacks F is (at least sometimes)17 evidence that it is
15 One often sees epistemologists formulate rules broadly along these lines. Take, for
instance, ”If something looks red to you and you have no reason to think that it is not
red then you are permitted to believe it is red” (Pollock and Cruz, 1999: 157), or
“Believe p whenever you have an experience or apparent perception as of p’s being the
case, and have no special reason to think that your experiences are unreliable in the cir-
cumstances” (Wedgwood 2002: 276).
16 Though of course, such a picture cannot handle seeming defeaters for doxastic states that
have as their contents propositions that are entailed by one’s evidence. I have serious
doubts about the ability of the rule-driven picture to handle even ordinary kinds of def-
eaters, but this is not the place to pursue them.
17 One might worry about subjects who lack knowledge that F is the correct justiﬁcation-
conferring property—would evidence that a state lacks F count as evidence that it is
ﬂawed for those subjects? However, at least for subjects who know that F is the justiﬁ-
cation-conferring property, evidence that a state lacks F would count as evidence that it
is ﬂawed. Such subjects are clearly possible.
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ﬂawed, or fails to be epistemically rational. Then, the property would have
to satisfy the following condition:
It is impossible for a subject’s doxastic state to have F if the subject has
evidence that her state lacks F.
Hence, having evidence that one’s state lacks F will entail that it in fact
lacks F. Are there viable candidates for justiﬁcation-conferring properties
that satisfy this condition?18 Consider, in particular, the following condition:
It is impossible for a subject’s doxastic state to be the result of applying
correct epistemic rules if the subject has evidence that her state is not the
result of applying correct epistemic rules.
The thought is that no correct epistemic rules allow being in a doxastic state
S in the presence of evidence that one has failed to apply correct epistemic
rules in coming to be in S. But, one might wonder, can’t a belief result
from applying an impeccable rule of inference even, for instance, in the
presence of strong evidence that someone has messed with one’s inferential
abilities, or that one has fallen victim to hypoxia? I will now give some ten-
tative reasons to think that this thought is right, and that the above condition
fails. I bolster this conclusion later, in connection with the €Uber-rule view.
First, I am not at all convinced that the epistemic rules we follow and
regard as correct have provisos for higher-order defeat built into them.
Take, for instance, a rule telling one to believe p when it perceptually seems
to one as if p and there is no reason to think that in the present situation,
how things seem isn’t a good guide to how they are. Call this rule Percep-
tion. But now consider a situation in which I believe that it is snowing out-
side based on its perceptually seeming to me as if it is snowing, but I also
have strong but misleading evidence that I have been given a drug that seri-
ously impairs my ability to form beliefs based on following Perception: the
drug makes me prone to misjudge how things seem to me. This is not evi-
dence that, in my present circumstances, how things seem is not a good
guide to how they are. Moreover, because the higher-order evidence is mis-
leading, it does in fact perceptually seem to me as if it is snowing. Hence,
in my circumstances Perception still recommends believing p. Or, take a
18 Of course one can build such a property by brute force: let F* be the property a state
has just in case one doesn’t have evidence that it lacks F*. To avoid this dubiously cir-
cular structure, one could instead construct F* as the property a state has just in case
there is no property G (such that G 6¼ F*) such that one has evidence that one’s state
lacks G. It is unclear whether a state would or even could ever have F*. But more
importantly, such properties are hardly candidates to confer justiﬁcation on doxastic
states.
322 MARIA LASONEN-AARNIO
rule urging one to infer q from p and if p, q in situations in which one
knows (or justiﬁably believes) both p and if p, q. The rule urges one to
infer q from p and if p, q even in situations involving evidence that modus
ponens is not a valid rule of logic. In so far as any such evidence is mis-
leading, isn’t the unqualiﬁed inference rule perfectly correct?
It is worth noting in passing that the idea that correct epistemic rules can
continue to apply in the presence of higher-order defeaters would provide a
diagnosis of a thought defended in several places by David Christensen,
namely, that in situations involving higher-order defeaters, subjects are
forced into a kind of epistemic imperfection:
Even though she’s capable of perfect logical insight, and even if she ﬂaw-
lessly appreciates which hypotheses best explain the evidence she has, she
cannot form the beliefs best supported by those logical or explanatory rela-
tions that she fully grasps. So…in taking HOE [higher-order evidence] into
account in certain cases, an agent is forced to embody a kind of epistemic
imperfection.19
Pointing out that correct epistemic rules can still recommend belief in the
presence of higher-order defeaters would be a step towards explaining such
intuitions: the imperfection in question would result from failing to follow
the recommendations made by perfectly correct inductive and deductive
rules.
Now, someone might object that the kinds of rules I have described are
not correct. Instead of the rule Perception, for instance, consider a rule Per-
ception*, which urges one to follow Perception with exceptions: one ought
not to follow Perception in situations involving evidence of the kind
described above, evidence that one is prone to misapply Perception, or evi-
dence that Perception is incorrect. If one thus speciﬁes the right epistemic
rules to start out with, one might wonder, is there any need for an additional
condition on justiﬁcation and hence, what I am calling a two-tiered theory?
But of course, a subject can acquire evidence that she has misapplied
Perception*, or that Perception* is incorrect. Though Perception* can pre-
vent a subject from inferring by Perception in situations involving higher-
order defeaters of the relevant sort, it cannot prevent one from inferring by
Perception* itself. I will leave discussion of an €Uber-rule that by deﬁnition
never encounters such problems for later.
I have given two tentative reasons to think that following correct episte-
mic rules cannot be a sufﬁcient condition on epistemic rationality. First,
having built-in provisos for higher-order defeaters just doesn’t seem like a
criterion for being a correct epistemic rule. And second, even when a rule
19 Christensen (2010a: 193)
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has some such provisos built into it, it need not have provisos for all
possible higher-order defeaters built into to it—and it is at least a prima
facie challenge to show how this would even be possible. More generally,
unless the justiﬁcation-conferring property F is a property that a doxastic
state can have only if one lacks evidence that the process producing the
state is ﬂawed in a defeat-inducing way, a theory of justiﬁcation able to
accommodate defeat by higher-order evidence must admit an additional con-
dition—a condition stating that the subject must lack evidence of the defeat-
ing kind. And so we have arrived at a two-tiered theory of justiﬁcation.
Such a theory has roughly the following form: A doxastic state S is justiﬁed
just in case (i) S has F, and (ii) one lacks evidence that S is ﬂawed. In so
far as what it is for a state to be ﬂawed is just for it to fail to have F, one
might hope to state (ii) neatly as follows: the subject must lack evidence
that her state lacks F.20
Within the context of a rule-driven picture, the rough idea will be that
a doxastic state is justiﬁed just in case (i) it is the product of following a
correct epistemic rule, and (ii) one doesn’t have evidence that it is ﬂawed.
A typical example of evidence that one’s state is ﬂawed is evidence that it
is the result of a failure to apply correct epistemic rules. Such evidence
can take various forms. It could be evidence that one has failed in one’s
attempt to apply what are in fact perfectly correct epistemic rules, it could
be evidence that the rules one has successfully applied are faulty, or it
could be evidence that favours neither of these possibilities. Compare: one
might acquire evidence that a device fails to run a program, evidence that
it runs a faulty program, or evidence that is ambiguous between these
alternatives. Evidence that a rule one has applied is incorrect is particularly
far-reaching, for it threatens to infect all states that result from applications
of the rule. Indeed, such evidence will play an important role in the
discussion below.
I have given a rough statement of the two-tiered theory I want to focus
on, but a bit more ﬁne-tuning may be needed. On one picture, all rational
doxastic responses involve applications of correct epistemic rules. But
there is also a more economical picture on which a doxastic response is
rational if it is either an application of a correct epistemic rule, or else it
is not prohibited by the correct rules. For instance, assume that I correctly
suspend judgment about whether I ate caramel cake on my third birthday
20 However, there are various issues that arise here. First, one might wonder about subjects
who don’t know that F is the justiﬁcation-conferring property, but acquire evidence that
their state lacks F. And second, what about subjects who have a false theory to the
effect that the justiﬁcation-conferring property is some property G, and who acquire evi-
dence that their state lacks that property? In so far as such a false theory is sufﬁciently
well supported, wouldn’t evidence that one’s state lacks G count as evidence that it is
ﬂawed?
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in circumstances in which I seem to remember that I did, but a reliable
testiﬁer says otherwise. The testiﬁer then admits to not having a clear
memory of the relevant event after all. But assume that the correct rules
don’t say what I must do in the new circumstances: there is no rule pro-
hibiting me from continuing to suspend judgment on the matter, and there
is no rule prohibiting me from believing that I did indeed eat caramel cake
on my third birthday. The thought, then, is that it is rational for me to do
either. But it might seem strained to say that if I come to now form the
relevant belief about my third birthday, I am following a correct epistemic
rule.21 Hence, proponents of a rule-driven picture need not be committed
even to the idea that it is a necessary condition on the rationality of any
doxastic state that it has come about through the application of a correct
epistemic rule.
With this qualiﬁcation on the table, the two-tiered theory of justiﬁcation I
wish to focus on can be formulated as follows:
Condition 1
A doxastic state S is epistemically rational only if [either] it is the result
of following correct epistemic rules [or it is at least not prohibited by the
correct rules].
Condition 2
A doxastic state S is epistemically rational only if one lacks evidence that
it is ﬂawed.22
I am reluctant to state Condition 2 as the condition that one lacks evidence
that one’s state fails Condition 1, for even subjects who lack knowledge of
what the correct justiﬁcation-conferring property is might acquire evidence
that their states are ﬂawed in a way that prevents them from being justiﬁed.
However, as noted above, evidence that a state did not come about by
applying correct epistemic rules certainly seems like a paradigm form of
evidence that the state is ﬂawed.
Though I focus on theories that endorse the rule-driven picture, I do not
mean to imply that views that fall outside it can avoid a two-tiered struc-
ture. Take, for instance, a reliabilist theory on which a belief is justiﬁed or
epistemically rational just in case it is the result of a reliable process (and
forming beliefs by reliable processes doesn’t amount to following correct
rules). The problem for such a theory is created by the observation that it
would seem possible for a belief to be the result of a perfectly reliable
21 This is so even if there is a rule that says that in my present circumstances I shouldn’t
believe that I didn’t eat caramel cake on my third birthday.
22 Recall that by “evidence that a state S is ﬂawed” I mean evidence that brings the likeli-
hood that it is ﬂawed above some threshold.
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process even in the presence of evidence that it is not. Imagine, for
instance, that I possess an infallible logical faculty, and have come to
believe p based on a deliverance of this faculty. I then acquire evidence
that I have been given a pill that causes me to make bad, undetectable
mistakes in my reasoning. Couldn’t I continue to believe p as the result of
a process that is 100% reliable in such circumstances? Reliabilists have
made various moves to avoid an explicitly two-tiered structure, none of
which I ﬁnd convincing. For instance, one could suggest that justiﬁed
belief in p requires not only that one’s belief be the result of a reliable
process, but that there be no alternative, equally reliable processes avail-
able to one that would not result in a belief in p.23 But it looks like no
alternative process by which I might come to give up belief in p would
be 100% reliable. And besides, the proposed view would not yield the
result that the subject would be justiﬁed in giving up her belief in p, since
there would be an alternative, competing process by which she could
continue believing p.
I have made a provisional case for the claim that a theory on which
following correct epistemic rules is both a necessary and sufﬁcient condition
for epistemic rationality or justiﬁcation is unable to accommodate the phe-
nomenon of defeat by higher-order evidence—and hence, that a two-tiered
theory of justiﬁcation is needed. I will spell out a puzzle created by the
two-tiered theory, and consider three responses. Before doing so, however,
I want to consider an argument to the effect that adding Condition 2 still
doesn’t take us even close to a set of sufﬁcient conditions on justiﬁcation.
I have assumed that higher-order defeat only ever happens as the result
of evidence that one’s doxastic state is ﬂawed, where being ﬂawed just is
lacking the justiﬁcation-conferring property F. But one might worry that this
isn’t the only form that defeat-inducing evidence can take. For what about
evidence that the component of justiﬁcation formulated by Condition 2 fails
to be satisﬁed that is not evidence that Condition 1 fails to be satisﬁed?
This would nevertheless be evidence that one’s belief fails to be justiﬁed or
epistemically rational, since Condition 2 is a necessary condition on justiﬁ-
cation. But isn’t evidence that one’s belief fails to be justiﬁed or epistemi-
cally rational higher-order evidence with defeating force with respect to that
belief? Those convinced by this could hope to remedy the problem by alter-
ing Condition 2 as follows:
Condition 2*
A doxastic state S is epistemically rational only if one lacks evidence that
S fails to be epistemically rational.
23 See Goldman (1986).
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Condition 2* would entail, then, that one of the ways in which a belief can
be defeated is if one has evidence that it fails to satisfy Condition 2* itself.
Condition 2* is circular in a manner that may seem problematic. For this
reason, proponents of the idea that justiﬁcation or epistemic rationality
entails lacking evidence that one is not justiﬁed might prefer to opt for a
theory that has inﬁnitely many conditions, taking something like the follow-
ing form:
Condition 1: X
Condition 2: One lacks evidence that one’s state is ﬂawed.
Condition 3: One lacks evidence that one has evidence that one’s state is
ﬂawed.
Condition 4: One lacks evidence that one has evidence that one has evidence
that one’s state is ﬂawed.
.
.
.
In so far as evidence that one’s belief is not justiﬁed is always evidence that
one of the conditions fails to be met, such a theory would yield the result
that evidence that a belief is not justiﬁed entails that it is not justiﬁed.24 So
perhaps only a theory with inﬁnitely many tiers could fully accommodate
the phenomenon of higher-order defeat.
Everything I say below is compatible with this theory being right. The
sort of puzzle created by a two-tier structure is also created by a structure
with inﬁnitely many tiers (or a theory that replaces Condition 2 by Condi-
tion 2*). However, I am not convinced that even the most astute proponents
of higher-order defeat are pressed to adopt it. In fact, I think that there are
excellent reasons not to. For consider the kind of evidence that, on this
account, would have defeating force, but that Condition 2 would not sufﬁce
to accommodate. It might be evidence that one has evidence that one’s state
is ﬂawed (perhaps, evidence that one has evidence that one has failed to
follow correct rules), without being evidence that it is ﬂawed (evidence that
one has failed to follow correct rules). Indeed, on the proposed theory, any
number of such iterations, no matter how great, would entail lacking justiﬁ-
cation. Now, sometimes one hears the slogan “evidence about evidence is
24 Cases in which a subject has evidence that one of the conditions fails to be met, without
having evidence, of any one of these conditions, that it is met, are trickier. For such
cases certainly seem like ones in which a subject has evidence that her belief fails to be
justiﬁed (since she has evidence that not all conditions on justiﬁcation are met) without
needing to fail any of the conditions on justiﬁcation. Such cases might show that there
is no way of avoiding a circular condition along the lines of Condition 2*. But the
remarks made below apply equally to Condition 2*.
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evidence”. In so far as the thought is that evidence that one has evidence
that p is entails having evidence that p, I think the slogan is simply mis-
taken. Its being probable that it is probable that p doesn’t entail that it is
probable that p. But in any case, if the slogan were true, there would be no
need for inﬁnitely many tiers in the ﬁrst place, for failing any Condition
2 + i would entail failing Condition 2. The need only arose from recogniz-
ing the falsity of the slogan. But in that case one wonders why, for instance,
evidence that one has evidence that one has evidence that one has failed to
follow correct epistemic rules isn’t too far removed to have any defeating
force. Such evidence may fail to make it sufﬁciently likely that one’s belief
is ﬂawed to have any defeating force.
Below I will say more about theories that may be able to avoid a two-tier
structure. But I think there is at least a prima facie case to be made in its
favour. Let me now ﬁnally state the kind of puzzle created by the two-tiered
theory of justiﬁcation sketched.
III. A Puzzle
Assume that a correct epistemic rule R recommends (requires) believing p
in circumstances C, and that Suzy is in fact in circumstances C. Suzy comes
to believe p as a result of applying R. But she then acquires evidence that
her doxastic state was not the result of applying a correct rule and is, there-
fore, ﬂawed (this may or may not be evidence that R itself is ﬂawed).
Assume that despite possessing this higher-order evidence, Suzy continues
to be in circumstances in which R recommends believing p.25 Nevertheless,
by Condition 2, believing p is no longer epistemically rational. However,
those who defend defeat by higher-order evidence typically claim that at
least in some such cases, there is a rational way (or a range of rational
ways) of revising one’s doxastic state.26 Perhaps Suzy ought now to sus-
pend judgment in p. But if suspending judgment in p is to be epistemically
rational, then the state of suspending judgment in p must itself satisfy Con-
dition 1.
Assume ﬁrst a view on which all rational doxastic responses are the
results of applying correct epistemic rules. Then, there must be a correct
epistemic rule telling Suzy to suspend judgment in p. But since circum-
stances C still obtain, there is also a correct epistemic rule, rule R, still tell-
ing Suzy to believe p. The upshot is that there is a correct epistemic rule
urging Suzy to believe p in her present circumstances, and there is a correct
25 Indeed, it was the possibility of such cases that created the need for a two-tiered theory
of justiﬁcation.
26 Note that Condition 2 alone does not guarantee this: violating it entails that a subject’s
doxastic state fails to be epistemically rational, but this does not entail that some speciﬁc
way of revising it would be rational.
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rule urging her not to believe p in her present circumstances. If correct rules
are accompanied by oughts, it looks like Suzy ought to believe p, and she
ought to suspend judgment in p. Exactly how should we conceive of the
structure of correct rules that make incompatible recommendations, and
exactly how should we think of the normative force of these rules?
What about the alternative, more economical view mentioned above on
which being produced by applying correct rules isn’t a necessary condition on
the rationality of a doxastic state? Unfortunately, the rationality of suspending
judgment in p cannot be explained by appeal to the idea that sometimes a state
can be epistemically rational just because it isn’t prohibited by any of the
correct rules—for there is a correct epistemic rule prohibiting Suzy from
suspending judgment in p, namely, the rule R she originally applied in com-
ing to believe p. If it is now rational for Suzy to suspend judgment in p, there
must be some rule urging Suzy to give up her belief in p (or there must at least
be correct rules that don’t allow Suzy to continue believing p). The same
puzzle arises: the correct rules seem to issue incompatible recommendations.
The puzzle cannot be dissolved simply by maintaining that correct episte-
mic rules should be formulated in terms of what one is permitted or not per-
mitted to do, not in terms of what one must do. It is true that there is
nothing puzzling about being permitted to believe p while equally being
permitted not to believe p. But rules formulated in terms of permissions
can—and had better—have entailments for what one ought to or must do.
For instance, if I am staring outside in ideal perceptual conditions, and can
see that it is not raining, it is plausible that I ought to believe that it is not
raining. I am simply not permitted to suspend judgment on the matter. And
in particular, those concerned with being able to accommodate defeat by
higher-order evidence won’t settle for the result that subjects are merely per-
mitted to adjust their doxastic states in the presence of higher-order defeat-
ers: they are positively required to do so.
First assume, as before, that there is a correct epistemic rule R that requires
Suzy to believe p in circumstances C—or at least that there is a set of rules
that collectively require Suzy to believe p in circumstances C. Suzy then
acquires the relevant sort of higher-order evidence, but she continues to be in
circumstances C. By R (or the set of rules in question), she is still required to
believe p. By rules governing higher-order defeat, she is not permitted to
believe p, but is instead required to be in some other doxastic state, even if
there is no unique alternative state she is required to be in. So there are correct
rules both telling Suzy to believe p and telling her not to believe p. Again,
how should we think of an epistemic system containing rules that make such
conﬂicting recommendations? Finally, even if R was a rule not requiring, but
merely permitting, Suzy to believe p in circumstances R, it is far from obvious
that the puzzle would disappear. For then there would be a correct rule (or
correct rules) telling Suzy that she may believe p, and there would be correct
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rules telling Suzy that she may not believe p. But she cannot both be permitted
to believe p and not be permitted to believe p.
Below I discuss three responses to the puzzle. One response simply
endorses it, conceding that cases of defeat by higher-order evidence create
epistemic dilemmas. I argue that friends of higher-order defeat should be
very unhappy with such a diagnosis. The other two paint broad, alternative
pictures of how we should think about correct epistemic systems. The ﬁrst
rejects the two-tiered theory of justiﬁcation sketched above—in particular,
the thought that a belief can be formed by a perfectly correct rule, while
still being defeated. Instead, it posits an €Uber-rule that makes recommenda-
tions about which doxastic responses are rational in any possible situation
(at least any situation in which there is some rational response), recommen-
dations that cannot, by the very nature of the €Uber-rule, be defeated. The
second structures epistemic rules in a hierarchical fashion, allowing for
one correct rule to overrule another. I will say why I ﬁnd neither of these
pictures appealing. But I don’t pretend to give a conclusive argument
against either. Instead, my primary aim is to map out the options that
remain for those who endorse something along the lines of Higher-order
defeat. Those, like myself, who are unhappy to endorse either option should
take the above puzzle as a reason to re-evaluate whether we should even try
to accommodate systematic defeat by higher-order evidence.
Let me begin with the €Uber-rule view.
IV. €Uber-Rules
Above I claimed that correct epistemic rules need not and don’t make provi-
sions for all possible higher-order defeaters. But maybe I have failed to con-
sider the kinds of epistemic rules that are ultimately correct. Someone might
object: “If there are situations in which it is no longer rational to apply a
rule R, then this shows that it was never a correct rule to start out with.
And if there are situations in which it is no longer rational to apply a rule
R* that tells one to infer by R except in certain situations involving higher-
order defeaters, then that shows that R* was never a correct rule to start out
with”. The thought is that for any possible situation—at least any situation
governed by epistemic norms—there is a rational doxastic response, and
one can encode these rational responses in an overarching “€Uber-rule”27.
The rule is identiﬁed by a function from epistemic circumstances to what-
ever the correct doxastic response is (or whatever the permitted doxastic
responses are) in those circumstances.
The €Uber-rule view solves the puzzle described above by not allowing it
to arise: because there is only one correct epistemic rule, and it never issues
27 I borrow the term from Christensen (2010a).
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incompatible recommendations, situations in which correct epistemic rules
make incompatible recommendations are impossible. I take the following,
then, to be deﬁnitional of what an €Uber-rule is. First, the rule is complete in
the following sense: for any circumstances in which there is some epistemi-
cally rational doxastic state in the ﬁrst place, the €Uber-rule codiﬁes what
that state (or range of states) is. And second, though we are assuming that
higher-order defeat is a real phenomenon, the following kind of situation
can never arise: a subject does exactly as the rule recommends, but she has
evidence that the resulting doxastic state is ﬂawed.
But is an €Uber-rule even possible? Finding a rule not susceptible to
defeat is surely harder than merely deﬁning one to be such! Consider, for
instance, the possibility of evidence that the €Uber-rule makes incorrect rec-
ommendations in some circumstances, where those include the circum-
stances a subject is in upon acquiring that very evidence. To have a more
concrete case in mind, assume that you are staring at a chart representing
the €Uber-rule: for each possible epistemic situation (or each relevant type
of situation), the chart speciﬁes what the recommendations made by the
€Uber-rule in that situation are. (Let us set aside worries having to do with
there being inﬁnitely many such situations.) Now imagine that you hear an
epistemology oracle tell you that the recommendations made by the €Uber-
rule in the very situation you are in right now are incorrect. In so far as the
rule is complete in the sense speciﬁed above, the chart must say something
about your current situation. Imagine that, as the chart tells you, the
rule recommends being in state S. But in so far as the oracle is to be
trusted, doesn’t her testimony act as a higher-order defeater for any such
recommendation?
But perhaps this doesn’t show that an €Uber-rule is impossible after all. If
nothing else, it is open to its proponents to allow the function corresponding
to the rule to be undeﬁned in certain circumstances. Here is a heuristic
picture. Take a candidate €Uber-rule, and go over every recommendation it
makes in every possible situation. Some of these may be ones in which the
rule recommends being in a doxastic state, but in which one has evidence
that the state in question is ﬂawed. Now, either change the recommendation
made by the rule into one that is not defeated, or—if that doesn’t work—
simply leave the rule undeﬁned. The circumstances in which the rule is
undeﬁned are ones that fall outside the purview of epistemic rationality.28
28 Hence, admitting the possibility of an €Uber-rule comes with the cost of admitting that epi-
stemic rationality falls apart in a range of circumstances. But this may not in itself be objec-
tionable, since anyone who holds on to a principle along the lines of Higher-order defeat is
pressed to admit that there are such cases. Consider, for instance, evidence that whatever
doxastic state one adopts, one is almost certain to commit some cognitive error. It seems
that there simply cannot be any rational way of responding to such evidence, for the evi-
dence has defeating force with respect to any attempt to take it into account.
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In an attempt to give the view a run for its money, I will grant that it is
possible to thus pick and choose a function that yields a rule with the
desired features and hence, that rules with the characteristic features of
€Uber-rules are at least possible.29
It is worth emphasizing how utterly different an €Uber-rule is from the
kinds of epistemic rules we ordinarily take ourselves to follow, or that both
ordinary folk and epistemologists take to be correct. In so far as our ordin-
ary epistemic rules don’t make provisions for all possible higher-order def-
eaters, too bad for them: on the €Uber-rule view this just shows that they are
incorrect to start out with. Hence, the view forces one into a kind of error-
theory about correct epistemic rules. One consequence of this is having to
reject what strikes me as a rather intuitive description of cases of defeat by
higher-order evidence: initially it was rational for a subject to apply a given,
perfectly correct, epistemic rule, but once the defeating evidence comes it, it
is no longer rational for her to do so. For instance, if I acquire strong evi-
dence that I am currently suffering from hypoxia, it is no longer rational for
me to believe a given proposition as a result of a sequence of applications
of modus ponens, even if believing it on such a basis was perfectly rational
before I acquired the evidence. But on the €Uber-rule view, a rule that it is
no longer rational to apply couldn’t ever have been correct in the ﬁrst
place.
I very much doubt whether there is any ﬁnite, informative way of
expressing the €Uber-rule. Recall the kinds of problems faced by attempts
to build a clause for higher-order defeaters into familiar-looking rules like
Perception. Perception* urged one to follow Perception with exceptions:
it tells one to follow Perception except when one has evidence that the
recommendation made by Perception is incorrect, or evidence that one is
susceptible to making cognitive errors in applying Perception. But of
course, it is possible to acquire evidence that Perception* itself is incorrect,
or that one has committed an error in attempting to apply Perception*. Of
course, one could invoke a new rule, Perception**, that recommends
following Perception* with exceptions, but this seems like a project with
no endpoint.
One might wonder whether it is even possible for subjects to genuinely
follow the €Uber-rule. Here proponents of the €Uber-rule view could try to
29 Note that this doesn’t guarantee that the following couldn’t happen: one can acquire evi-
dence, in some circumstances Ci, that the recommendations made by the rule in other
circumstances Cj are incorrect. Hence, one can have evidence that what is in fact a cor-
rect €Uber-rule is incorrect. Someone might worry that this in itself is a problem: how
can it be rational to be guided by a rule that it is rational to take to be, overall, incor-
rect? However, it is at least less clear whether evidence that a rule makes incorrect rec-
ommendations in other circumstances has any defeating force with respect to the
recommendations made by the rule in one’s present circumstances.
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bring simple epistemic rules of the kind we take ourselves to follow to
the rescue, for they may act as good heuristics for approximating the
€Uber-rule. The thought is that by being guided by and following rules
that are ultimately incorrect, a subject could also be following the €Uber-
rule. After all, there is no reason to think that subjects couldn’t follow
numerous epistemic rules at once, or that a subject couldn’t make mis-
takes in following an epistemic rule. But even granting this, an €Uber-rule
seems to slot very awkwardly into the theoretical role that epistemic rules
are supposed to occupy within the rule-driven picture of epistemic cogni-
tion. In effect, the €Uber-rule view is in danger of compromising the kinds
of motivations epistemologists routinely have for adopting the picture in
the ﬁrst place.
To see why, let me digress a bit and ask what makes certain epistemic
norms and rules the correct ones, the ones that can be employed to form
epistemically rational and justiﬁed beliefs. An answer to this question would
constitute at least a partial answer to the question of what makes justiﬁed
beliefs justiﬁed. By far the most popular answers have appealed to some sort
of connection between justiﬁcation and the goal or aim of belief, which most
take to be truth.30 Earl Conee, for instance, writes that “the existence of some
special intimate connection between epistemic justiﬁcation and truth seems
to be beyond reasonable doubt”.31 A popular way of establishing the connec-
tion is to view justiﬁcation as falling out of practically rational or reasonable
means by which to pursue the goal of belief.32 Hence, the rough idea is that
our beliefs aim at truth (or, perhaps, knowledge), and justiﬁcation is a means
to get there. Justiﬁed beliefs are good relative to the goal of belief.
Whatever the truth (or knowledge) connection amounts to, rules such as
“Believe p just in case p is true” won’t serve as the kind of means for pur-
suing truth that we are looking for, as such rules don’t offer enough guid-
ance as to what exactly it is that one should do in order to believe the
truth.33 What we are looking for is something by means of which true belief
and knowledge can be obtained. And it is worth noting that the idea that
correct epistemic norms must be capable of offering guidance has been pop-
ular independently of appeals to some sort of truth-connection.34 Now, the
problem for the €Uber-rule view is that an €Uber-rule just don’t seem like the
kind of rule that can offer genuine guidance. For one, it cannot even be
30 See, for instance, Cohen (1984), Conee (1992), Goldman (1979), Kornblith (1993),
Wedgwood (2002).
31 Conee (1992: 657).
32 See, for instance, Chisholm (1982: 4), Bonjour (1985: 7-8), Conee (1992), David (2001)
and Wedgwood (2002).
33 Cf. Wedgwood (2002: 276).
34 See, for instance, Pollock & Cruz (1999).
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expressed as a set of ﬁnite, informative generalisations.35 It differs from all
of the candidate rules that epistemologists have formulated and taken actual
subjects to be guided by. Even if one argues that subjects manage to genu-
inely follow the €Uber-rule by employing more ordinary kinds of epistemic
rules as heuristic guides, the fact remains that they need guidance to follow
the €Uber-rule itself. Hence, the €Uber-rule is a very awkward candidate for a
rule that is itself supposed to play the role of offering genuine guidance.
Resorting to an €Uber-rule seems to force one into a genuine kind of epi-
stemic particularism: there are no useful, informative generalisations about
what the epistemically rational ways of managing one’s beliefs are.36
A belief is rational just in case it results from following the €Uber-rule, but
we have no reason to expect the rule itself to be expressible in any ﬁnite,
informative way. At most what we can hope for is rough approximations
that track the more ordinary kinds of epistemic rules. Initially one may have
at least hoped that facts about epistemic rationality wouldn’t be as messy as
they come out to be on the €Uber-rule view.
35 The phenomenon of higher-order defeat also raises worries about whether any rule that
urges one, for instance, to cease inferring by logically valid rules in certain circum-
stances can guide one towards true belief or knowledge: wouldn’t a rule that simply
urges one to always infer by valid rules do a much better job? I think there is much to
ponder here, but will set the question aside.
36 Those writing on the subject of moral particularism sometimes take it for granted that
reasons for belief behave in a particularist way—in effect, an argument not infrequently
given in favour of moral particularism is that particularism is true of reasons in general,
including reasons for belief. Moral particularism is usually stated as the view that the
moral relevance of a feature or property of an action is not invariant. Often this is split
up into a two-part claim: ﬁrst, there is no invariant way in which features contribute to
moral reasons, and second, there is no invariant way in which moral reasons contribute
to determining what the morally right thing to do is (see, for instance, Berker 2007). At
ﬁrst sight it may look as though such particularism has got to be true of reasons for
belief. Perhaps, for instance, its perceptually seeming to one as if p is a (prima facie)
reason to believe p, but this reason can be defeated by learning, for instance, that one is
hallucinating. The issue may rest on exactly what one means by “invariant”, but it is far
from clear to me that ordinary defeaters push epistemologists towards particularism.
Though those who give the notion of a reason a central role in their theories tend to
think that the rationality of a doxastic state regarding a proposition p is not determined
solely by the overall set of reasons that weigh either in favour or against p, they tend to
think that it is determined in an invariant way by the set of reasons together with the set
of defeaters (which themselves are reasons, but not ones that need to directly weight in
favour or against p). Its seeming to one as if p, for instance, is always at least a prima
facie reason in favour of believing p. Indeed, there is a sense in which the views of epis-
temologists such as John Pollock are paradigm forms of epistemic generalism: given the
total set of reasons (and defeaters) present, it is possible to state a general, fairly simple
rule for how they combine to determine an overall epistemic verdict about what one
should believe (indeed, a large part of Pollock’s life project in epistemology was the
attempt to formulate such a rule). It is no surprise that Pollock is a proponent of the idea
that to be justiﬁed, a belief must be licensed by the correct epistemic rules or norms,
and he certainly doesn’t claim that it is impossible to formulate such norms (see, for
instance, Pollock and Joseph, 1999).
334 MARIA LASONEN-AARNIO
I don’t take myself to have provided a knock-down argument against the
€Uber-rule view. But I do hope to have showed that it involves some very
controversial commitments. It is wedded to an error theory about correct
rules. It pushes one towards a deep kind of epistemic particularism on
which there are no useful, informative generalisations about what the episte-
mically rational ways of managing one’s beliefs are. And, perhaps most
important of all, it is not clear whether €Uber-rules are at all ﬁt to play the
kind of guidance-role that proponents of a rule-driven picture commonly
require (correct) epistemic rules to play.
At this point it is worth asking whether there might be other theories that
reject the multiple-tiered theory of justiﬁcation described in the beginning.
Recall that what created the need for Condition 2—thereby also creating the
puzzle discussed at the outset of there being incompatible but correct episte-
mic rules—was the thought that it is possible to employ a perfectly correct
epistemic rule while having evidence that one has failed to do so. In a
search for a single-tiered theory of justiﬁcation, one might suggest giving
up the idea that there is a ﬁxed set of correct epistemic rules (a set that
might consist solely of an €Uber-rule). Indeed, one could suggest that what
makes a rule correct for a subject at a time is just its being rational for the
subject to believe that it has some desirable feature X—perhaps its being
rational for her to believe that it is a good means for pursuing truth or
knowledge, or even its being rational for her to believe that it is correct.
The hope is that in cases of higher-order defeat it is never rational for the
subject to believe, of the rule(s) she has employed in forming the relevant
belief, that those rules have feature X.
But unfortunately, the proposed account still allows for employing a cor-
rect rule while having evidence that one has failed to do so. For instance,
the subject’s belief may be the output of a rule R that is perfectly correct
(because it is rational for her to believe R to have feature X), while she has
strong evidence that it is the output of some other, incorrect, rule. Rather
than an account that says that a belief is rational or justiﬁed just in case it
is the result of applying rules that it is rational for the subject to believe to
have some property X, perhaps what is needed is an account that says that
a belief is rational or justiﬁed just in case it is rational for the subject to
believe that it is the result of correctly applying epistemic rules with prop-
erty X.
The resulting theory implies that a belief can be justiﬁed even if it is pro-
duced by a seemingly terrible rule—indeed, even a rule that it is rational
for the subject to regard as terrible. For the subject may rationally but incor-
rectly take her belief to have come about by the employment of some other
rule. And for pretty much any rule, there may be circumstances in which it
is rational to believe it to have the desirable property X. So on the proposed
account, there are hardly any rules that couldn’t produce justiﬁed belief.
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Few epistemologists would be willing to go this far. And of course, the
theory faces a rather obvious worry of circularity: rational belief is being
characterized in terms of what it is rational for a subject to believe. Even if
a fully reductive account or analysis of epistemic rationality or justiﬁcation
cannot be achieved, one might at least hope for a theory that uses a differ-
ent, even if closely related, notion.
Let me now turn to views that endorse a two-tiered theory of justiﬁca-
tion. I begin with a view on which defeat by higher-order evidence creates
genuine epistemic dilemmas.
V. Epistemic Binds and Dilemmas
One type of reaction to the puzzle outlined above is to concede that defeat by
higher-order evidence gives rise to epistemic binds, situations in which it is
simply impossible to act in a reasonable or rational manner. Such binds might
be created by the incompleteness of the correct epistemic rules, or by their
incompatibility. The view I want to discuss now is one on which the correct
epistemic rules are incompatible: cases of defeat by higher-order evidence
present genuine epistemic dilemmas, situations in which a subject is con-
demned to doing something she ought not to do and hence, to falling short of
epistemic rationality. The view rests on the following two assumptions:
1) If a subject has evidence that her doxastic state is ﬂawed, then the
state fails to count as epistemically rational, and she ought to revise
it.
2) If an epistemic rule is correct, and the rule tells one to believe p in
circumstances C, and one is in fact in circumstances C, then one
ought to believe p.
The ﬁrst of these assumptions more or less follows from a desire to
accommodate defeat by higher-order evidence (and from the principle
Higher-order defeat). It is the second that is distinctive of the epistemic
dilemmas view (ED-view). The thought is that the ought attaching to a
correct epistemic rule is never defeated in the sense of losing its potency,
but the presence of certain types of evidence can create another, competing
ought.37 Failing to revise beliefs in the presence of evidence that they are
37 I don’t here have in mind a view on which two different kinds of oughts compete in
cases of defeat by higher-order evidence: one ought1 to be in doxastic state S, but one
ought2 not to not be in S. Indeed, the kind of view I want to in the end defend is com-
patible with different kinds of epistemic oughts pulling in different directions in cases of
defeat by higher-order evidence. Instead, I take pure epistemic dilemmas to be ones in
which one ought1 to be in doxastic state S, but one ought1 not to not be in S. Thanks to
Carrie Jenkins for helping me clarify this.
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ﬂawed is a sufﬁcient condition for epistemic irrationality, as there is a cor-
rect epistemic norm or rule in place telling one to give up such beliefs. But
failing to act in accordance with a correct epistemic rule is likewise a sufﬁ-
cient condition for epistemic irrationality. In situations involving higher-
order defeat, two rules that normally happily coexist pull in different direc-
tions, neither being overridden by the other. The subject is doomed to epi-
stemic irrationality.
I don’t want to rest my case against the ED-view on an argument against
the existence of epistemic dilemmas. Rather, what I want to draw attention
to is that it is not clear whether the view allows saying the right things
about defeat by higher-order evidence after all. Presumably, proponents of
defeat by higher-order evidence would want to say that at least in a lot of
cases subjects ought, all things considered, to revise their beliefs in the pres-
ence of higher-order defeaters. Minimally, they would want to maintain that
even if a subject’s doxastic states are doomed to falling short of full ratio-
nality, there is often a best option, an option that takes one closest to ratio-
nality or justiﬁcation.38 However, I am very skeptical of whether there is a
stable ED-view that can make sense of such overall oughts.
Here is a toy picture. Assume that there are degrees of epistemic ratio-
nality, and being rational, full-stop, requires being rational to a maximal
degree, which means abiding by all correct epistemic rules or norms.
There are also degrees of irrationality, but by contrast, the threshold for
irrationality is non-maximal (indeed, one might even think that failing to
be fully rational entails being irrational). Where a subject’s doxastic state
falls on the rationality/irrationality scale depends on the extent to which
correct epistemic rules are violated. Determining the extent to which
correct rules are violated will involve some complicated formula that
weighs different epistemic rules. The precise details won’t matter. What
matters is the thought that the less irrational one is the better: all things
considered, a subject ought to manage her doxastic states in ways that
minimize her irrationality score.
Assume that Rule 1 and Rule 2 are correct epistemic rules. Take a situa-
tion in which Rule 1 tells a subject to believe p, and Rule 2 tells her to
suspend judgment in p. The subject ought to believe p, but she ought also
to suspend belief in p, and she cannot do both. The kind of result needed is
that abiding by Rule 2 (for instance) constitutes a lesser degree of epistemic
irrationality. Perhaps, in the grand scheme of things, Rule 2 bears more
weight than Rule 1. But it is reasonable to ask what underlies such facts
about which violation would constitute the least degree of epistemic
38 Christensen (2007a, 2010a) at least comes close to a view on which there are epistemic
dilemmas, but even in situations involving such dilemmas, certain doxastic responses are
better than others.
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irrationality. It is clear that these questions cannot be answered just by appeal
to the correct rules. After all, there is nothing built into Rule 1 or Rule 2 as
such that would determine which takes priority in situations of conﬂict. If
Rule 1 had an exception built into it of the sort telling one to do what Rule 2
says in certain situations, we wouldn’t be dealing with a genuine epistemic
dilemma. And it won’t help to introduce an extra rule telling one what the
best way of resolving such conﬂicts would be. Assume that Rule 3 recom-
mends following Rule 2 in situations of conﬂict. In so far as one ought to
instantiate the least possible degree of epistemic irrationality, the result
needed is that one ought to follow Rule 3—and moreover, that the ought
attaching to Rule 3 is somehow weightier than the ought attaching to Rule 1.
But the problem is that Rule 3 is just another rule. The overriding ought to
abide by Rule 3, thereby violating Rule 1, cannot be created by Rule 3 alone.
To solve this problem, it looks like the correct rules must come with
weightings determining the strengths that the oughts attached to them have
in situations of conﬂict. But then the worry arises that we are dealing with
an unstable position, having taken on a deﬁning commitment of a view to
be discussed below, one that orders epistemic rules in a hierarchical fashion.
Indeed, unless the weightings are thought of as determining relations of pri-
ority between rules and the oughts attached to them, it is difﬁcult to see
what could ground the overall oughts that we are looking for. For let us
concede that the weightings determine degrees of rationality. But why ought
a subject to instantiate the least degree of irrationality possible given her sit-
uation? One might retort that this objection is based on a misunderstanding.
Epistemic rationality just is following the correct rules. In addition to the
correct epistemic rules, one certainly doesn’t need an extra rule telling one
to be epistemically rational—what one ought to do is handled by the correct
epistemic rules. But the problem is precisely that in situations of conﬂict,
the correct rules don’t tell one what to do, not unless we are able to extract
some overriding, all-things-considered oughts from the way they are
weighted or ordered. And besides, it doesn’t follow from the fact that one
ought to do what the correct rules tell one to do that when these rules come
into conﬂict, one ought to aim for the smallest possible violations. The
desirability of instantiating some X to a full degree doesn’t generally entail
that when achieving X to a full degree is beyond reach, one ought to
achieve X to the highest degree possible.
I have expressed scepticism about whether genuine epistemic dilemmas
can be reconciled with the idea that even when a subject cannot be fully
rational, there may be a most rational option available to her that she ought
to choose. To accommodate this idea proponent of epistemic dilemmas must
adopt the kind of hierarchical ordering of epistemic rules that I will now
discuss.
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VI. Hierarchies
The hierarchy view maintains that though cases of defeat by higher-order
evidence create situations in which correct epistemic rules make conﬂicting
recommendations, these situations don’t constitute epistemic dilemmas, for
one of the conﬂicting rules will overrule or override the others. A particu-
larly welcome result would be that rules pertaining to defeat override the
relevant ﬁrst-order inductive and deductive rules. Take, for instance, a case
in which a subject acquires strong but misleading evidence that she has
been given a drug that makes her mess up in even the simplest of infer-
ences, while making it seem to her as if she is inferring by perfectly valid
rules. The thought is that in such circumstances a perfectly correct, valid
inference rule may be overridden by a rule telling one to give up belief in
the presence of sufﬁciently strong evidence that the cognitive process pro-
ducing the belief is ﬂawed.
To get such overruling to happen, in addition to a set of correct episte-
mic rules, we need some sort of relation ordering those rules, a relation
determining which rules take priority in situations of conﬂict.39 An episte-
mic system will be comprised of two elements: a set of correct epistemic
rules, and an ordering relation on these rules. The former can be thought of
as functions from (epistemic) circumstances to doxastic states; the latter can
be thought of as a function from (epistemic) circumstances to functions
from epistemic circumstances to doxastic states—that is, a function from
circumstances to epistemic rules. As such, the ordering relation is a kind of
meta-rule, a rule telling one which rule to follow.
At this point one may wonder what the difference between the hierar-
chy view and the €Uber-rule view amounts to. After all, given any hierar-
chy of epistemic rules, one can construct a super-rule based on the
hierarchy as follows: for any possible situation, let the super-rule recom-
mend doing just what the hierarchy as a whole would recommend. Given
that the epistemic system comprising the hierarchy and the super-rule
would fully agree about which doxastic responses are rational in any possi-
ble circumstances, isn’t the hierarchy view equivalent to the €Uber-rule
view? While it may be true that the two views agree on what doxastic
responses would be rational in any possible situation, the structures gener-
ating these verdicts are very different. And there are various issues the
views disagree about. In particular, the hierarchy view is able to recognize
a distinction between which rules it is rational to employ on a given occa-
sion and which rules are correct: a rule R can be perfectly correct and
rational to follow even if there are situations in which it is not rational to
39 Though I speak of hierarchies of epistemic rules, thinking in terms of an image of a
ﬁxed hierarchy of rules may not be accurate. I want to allow for a rule R to override
another rule R’ in certain circumstances, but for R’ to override R in others.
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follow R, since in those situations R is dominated by a higher-level rule.
But recall that on the €Uber-rule view it can never cease to be rational to
follow a correct rule. The hierarchy view posits a plethora of correct rules
and a relation ordering them (relative to circumstances), the €Uber-rule view
posits exactly one.
Can the hierarchy view do with a single meta-rule that orders the ﬁrst-
order epistemic rules? Here the hierarchy theorist faces an important
decision point. Recall that the need for a meta-rule ordering the correct
ﬁrst-order rules arose because it was assumed that correct epistemic rules
could continue to make recommendations in situations in which one has
higher-order evidence with defeating force with respect to those recommen-
dations. But to prevent having to take refuge in a meta-meta rule ordering
candidate meta-rules, nothing analogous had better be the case for the meta-
rule itself. For imagine that the meta-rule could recommend following rule
R1 (rather than R2) in a situation in which the two rules conﬂict, but in
which one has evidence that any ordering giving priority to R1 over R2 is
ﬂawed. This would look very much like a higher-order defeater for the
meta-rule itself. Or, take a case in which instead of having evidence that the
ordering delivered by the meta-rule is incorrect, one has evidence that one
is highly likely to incorrectly apply the meta-rule, giving priority to the
wrong epistemic rule.
To prevent such situations from arising, one could stipulate that the
meta-rule is special: unlike ﬁrst-order epistemic rules, it will never make a
recommendation in the presence of evidence with defeating force with
respect to that recommendation. But by now talk of a rule that is thus
immune to defeat should sound familiar, for recall that it is a distinctive
feature of €Uber-rules! If the meta-rule is invincible when it comes to
defeat, then in effect, it is an €Uber meta-rule. Hence, on the kind of hier-
archy view under consideration, the need for an €Uber-rule is merely
pushed up one level. Not only does the resulting view buy into core com-
mitments of the €Uber-rule view, thereby being susceptible to similar prob-
lems, but it also looks like an awkward compromise between two different
approaches.
The other option is to admit that higher-order defeat can happen at the
level of meta-rules: it is possible for circumstances to arise, for instance, in
which a meta-rule M1 recommends following some ﬁrst-level rule R1 rather
than R2, but there is evidence that any such recommendation is incorrect.
Perhaps this evidence points to the rationality of following some further rule
R3 instead. If such cases are possible, then it looks like the hierarchy theo-
rist will have to resort to meta-meta rules, for we now face a situation at
the level of meta-rules that is similar to the one we faced at the level of
ﬁrst-order epistemic rules: a meta-rule recommends following a ﬁrst-order
rule R1, but acting in accordance with the recommendation is irrational
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because of a higher-order defeater. In so far as one now ought not to adopt
the doxastic state recommended by R1, one ought to follow some other
rule instead. Then, there must be an alternative meta-rule M2 making a
recommendation that conﬂicts with the recommendation made by M1. But if
there are two meta-rules M1 and M2 making conﬂicting recommendations,
for reasons outlined above we need a meta-meta rule to tell us which one to
follow. Just as meta-rules can be represented by functions from circum-
stances to ﬁrst-order rules, meta-meta-rules can be represented by functions
from circumstances to meta-rules.
Allowing for multiple correct meta-rules that make conﬂicting recom-
mendations in certain situations looks like the beginning of an inﬁnite
regress. Hence, the only alternative to admitting that the meta-hierarchy ter-
minates in an €Uber-rule at some level seems to be admitting that it doesn’t
terminate at all. In an inﬁnite meta-hierarchy, conﬂicts between epistemic
rules can arise at any level. I for one am far from comfortable with the
thought that the correct epistemic system consists of such an inﬁnite hierar-
chy of epistemic rules, though I admit to not being able to offer decisive
argument against such hierarchies. Here are a couple of qualms. First, there
is no upper bound to how far up the meta-hierarchy one would have to
climb in some situations before ﬁnding a recommendation made by a meta-
rule that is not defeated. As a result, it is doubtful whether ﬁnite beings
could be guided or governed by such complex epistemic systems. Again,
can the inﬁnite hierarchy as a whole play the guidance-role that correct epi-
stemic rules were initially supposed to play? Moreover, it is not clear how
different in the end the hierarchy view is from the kind of epistemic particu-
larism sketched in connection with the €Uber-rule view. Because of the mul-
tiple forms that higher-order evidence can take, it is far from clear whether
the inﬁnite hierarchy would exhibit patterns that could be stated in ﬁnite
generalizations. As a result, it is not clear whether we can extract from the
hierarchy useful, informative generalizations about epistemic rationality—at
least not ones that could be stated in a ﬁnite language. If systematic higher-
order defeat of the kind that respects principles like Higher-order defeat for-
mulated above is a real epistemic phenomenon, facts about it look to be
very messy.
The proponent of the hierarchy view faces a choice: either make one of
the meta-rules into an €Uber-rule, a rule such that its recommendations can
never be defeated, or allow for an inﬁnite hierarchy of meta-rules, with
numerous correct rules at each level that can come into conﬂict with each
other. Neither option strikes me as a triumphant way out of the puzzle
created by trying to accommodate higher-order defeat within the context of
a two-tiered theory of justiﬁcation.
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VII. The Limits of Defeat
I have looked at three ways of responding to the puzzle sketched above.
Of the views that endorse systematic defeat by higher-order evidence, the
strongest contenders appear to be the €Uber-rule view and a view that endorses
an inﬁnite hierarchy of correct epistemic rules. A theme common to both
approaches is a kind of epistemic particularism, which may not be reconcil-
able with commitments of the rule-driven picture of epistemic cognition.
Hopefully even those who don’t share my qualms about these views will ﬁnd
the exposition of their commitments useful. But assume that I am right that
there is no elegant way of accommodating systematic defeat by higher-order
evidence. I want to end on a more speculative note, outlining what I take to be
the correct response to the initial puzzle.
Ultimately, I think the right conclusion to draw is that the desire to
accommodate limitless defeat lands one into a paradoxical predicament with
no happy resolution. The predicament is created by the following two
assumptions. First, for any epistemic rule or principle, there are possible sit-
uations in which one acquires evidence that a doxastic state that is in fact
an output of that rule is ﬂawed. And second, in such circumstances episte-
mic rationality calls for revising the doxastic states in question: there is
some correct epistemic rule or principle dictating that it would be irrational
not to do so. The conclusion I want to draw is that there is no non-paradox-
ical notion of justiﬁcation or epistemic rationality that can accommodate
these ideas.
I don’t see any grounds for questioning the ﬁrst assumption. Nor do
I think that one should jettison the very idea of epistemic rationality as
inherently incoherent. Instead, I think the second assumption is the culprit.
It may come as a surprise that in some cases a state can be perfectly episte-
mically rational even if one has what would seem like strong evidence for
thinking that it is not. In particular, in so far as there is such a thing as a
correct inductive policy or epistemic system, it can be rational to follow the
recommendations of that policy or system even if one possesses evidence
that in doing so one has committed a rational error. Such a conclusion
doesn’t rest on anything like an externalist epistemology. It rests merely on
a desire to avoid paradox. Hence, I take the considerations put forth above
to constitute at least a tentative, non question-begging argument for a kind
of externalism.
So, for instance, it may be rational to conditionalise a correct prior cre-
dence function on what would look to be evidence that that credence func-
tion is incorrect—or even evidence that conditionalisation is not the right
rule for taking new evidence into account. Sometimes this may result in a
situation in which it is rational to assign a high credence to one’s epistemic
rules or policies being incorrect. Now, someone might be inspired by
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remarks made by David Lewis to reject such a position as incoherent.40 For
how could a correct epistemic system recommend one doxastic
response while recommending the belief that that doxastic response is incor-
rect? Wouldn’t it be recommending that one φ while recommending that
one adopt in its place a system that doesn’t recommend that one φ, thereby
issuing incompatible recommendations?41 I think the correct response to this
is that it would do no such thing. Recommending that one believe that a
rule is ﬂawed is not tantamount to recommending that one stop following
the rule. That one should believe that one shouldn’t φ doesn’t entail that
one shouldn’t φ.42
Thinking about defeat easily leads to over-inﬂating the notion of
epistemic rationality. There is an intuition that subjects ought to revise
their doxastic states in the presence of evidence that those states are
ﬂawed, and that they are criticisable for not doing so. I think these intu-
itions correct. Moreover, I think that subjects who fail to revise their
beliefs in putative cases of defeat are criticisable from an epistemic point
of view: they are being unreasonable by failing to take into account evi-
dence about their own cognitive imperfections, thereby manifesting dispo-
sitions that are bad from the perspective of acquiring knowledge or true
belief.43 But I very much doubt whether there is a non-paradoxical
notion of epistemic rationality that marches step in step with such criti-
cisability. There are epistemic oughts that a subject can violate without
thereby being epistemically irrational, or failing to meet the criteria for
justiﬁcation.44
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